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Abstract 
In recent times, technology has advanced in such a manner that the world can now 
communicate in means previously never thought possible. Transnational organised crime 
groups, who have exploited these new technologies as basis for their criminal success, 
however, have not overlooked this development, growth and globalisation. Law enforcement 
agencies have been confronted with an unremitting challenge as they endeavour to intercept, 
monitor and analyse these communications as a means of disrupting the activities of criminal 
enterprises. The challenge lies in the ability to recognise and change tactics to match an 
increasingly sophisticated adversary. The use of communication interception technology, 
such as phone taps or email interception, is a tactic that when used appropriately has the 
potential to cause serious disruption to criminal enterprises. Despite the research that exists 
on CIT and TOC, these two bodies of knowledge rarely intersect. This paper builds on 
current literature, drawing them together to provide a clearer picture of the use of CIT in an 
enforcement and intelligence capacity. It provides a review of the literature pertaining to 
TOC, the structure of criminal enterprises and the vulnerability of communication used by 
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these crime groups. Identifying the current contemporary models of policing it reviews 
intelligence-led policing as the emerging framework for modern policing. Finally, it assesses 
the literature concerning CIT, its uses within Australia and the limitations and arguments that 
exist. In doing so, this paper provides practitioners with a clearer picture of the use, barriers 
and benefits of using CIT in the fight against TOC. It helps to bridge the current gaps in 
modern policing theory and offers a perspective that can help drive future research. 
Keywords: communication interception technology, transnational organised crime, 
intelligence-led policing, signals intelligence, open source intelligence 
1. Introduction 
The consistent development of communication technology and the subsequent growth in its 
usage and popularity by society has not been limited to legitimate uses. These technological 
advances have also been adopted by criminals to advance their own illicit goals. With 
transnational organised crime (TOC) much of this communication makes use of modern 
technology and, as such, communication interception technology (CIT) is a crucial weapon 
that can be utilised. However, without the placement of CIT in the correct policing 
framework and a viable knowledge management model, it is a weapon lacking efficiency or 
effectiveness.  
While research exists on TOC and CIT—albeit outdated or with a primary focus on privacy 
concerns—these two bodies of knowledge rarely intersect to examine the effective and 
practical use CIT can have against TOC. It is imperative to understand how TOC groups are 
operating, how they are structured and more importantly, how they can be stopped. This 
study addresses important gaps in modern policing theory by posing the following research 
questions: “how effective is communication interception technology in the fight against 
TOC?” and “how is communication interception technology best managed in a practical law 
enforcement framework?”  
This paper builds on existing organised criminality and CIT literature, drawing them together 
to provide a clearer overview of CITs use in an enforcement and intelligence capacity. It 
reviews pre-existing literature that guides the understanding and concepts that underpin TOC 
and CIT. Specifically, it examines first the defining concepts of TOC, the general work on the 
structure of criminal enterprises, the nature of communication within these groups and finally 
the legal responses that Australia has introduced in recognition of this growing threat.   
2. Methodology 
To answer the research questions and address the gaps in current research, this study uses a 
qualitative research methodology employing grounded theory; and a systematic sampling and 
coding strategy outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998) to ensure that the collection and 
categorisation of the data provided detailed and credible information relevant to the research 
objectives. Document analysis was chosen as the primary method of data collection for its 
ability to examine subjects not easily accessible because of the dearth of research previously 
conducted on the topic of CIT. Triangulation and validity through the systemic sampling and 
coding strategies ensured the study’s trustworthiness.  
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Source documents (such as academic journals, periodicals, scholarly books, legal statutes, 
reports by law enforcement agencies, etc) on such topic areas as; organised crime, 
transnational crime, intelligence theory and intelligence practice, as well as communication 
interception technology and models of policing transnational organised crime, were critically 
examined during the course of this research. 
3. Literary Review Findings 
3.1 Understanding TOC 
TOC is defined by the United Nations as: “structured groups of three or more persons acting 
together, over a period of time, with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes 
committed in more than one State, or has significant effect on another state, or elements of 
planning, preparation, direction or control occur in another State” (United Nations, 2000, 
pp.25-26).  
Whilst TOC can be viewed as a broad spectrum of activity, LEAs note a range of specific 
‘organised’ activities, including money laundering, drug trafficking, sex/human trafficking, 
people smuggling, arms trafficking, endangered species trafficking, cybercrime and most 
notably over the past decade, terrorism (Grennan & Britz, 2006; Borger, 2007; Davies, 2007; 
Lyman & Potter, 2007; Australian Crime Commission, 2009; Abadinsky, 2009;).  
Unlike many ‘habitual’ forms of crime, TOC defies ‘tradition’ and exploits the reactive crime 
control techniques currently utilised by LEAs (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). From this, 
there has been substantial disagreement over the ability to succinctly define such an adaptable 
assortment of crimes and groups. This paper uses the definition put forward by Conklin 
(2009, 73) who, sharing similar definitional notions put forward by Abadinsky (1994; 2007), 
and Grennan and Britz (2006, p.12), describes organised crime as: 
“Criminal activity by an enduring structure or organization developed and devoted 
primarily to the pursuit of profits through illegal means...organized crime has the 
characteristics of a formal organization: a division of labor, coordination of 
activities through rules and codes, and an allocation of tasks in order to achieve 
certain goals. The organization tries to preserve itself in the face of external and 
internal threats” (Conklin, 2009, p.73). 
3.2 Structure of TOC groups 
The structure of organised crime networks, domestic or transnational, have long since been 
viewed as highly organised hierarchical structures, with groups such as the Sicilian Mafia, 
popularised in novels and film, influencing common perceptions. In reality crime groups have 
modified their structures into what Cressey (1997, p.3) and Williams (2001, p.70) describe as 
“fluid, dynamic and loosely structured networks that are highly flexible and possess the 
ability to adapt to relevant influences, designed with an intention to confuse authorities and 
protect their organisation”.  
The organisational structure of crime groups are highly debateable. However research by the 
United Nations (2002) led to the development of five TOC organisational structures: standard 
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hierarchy; regional hierarchy; clustered hierarchy; core group; criminal network (United 
Nations 2002). Lyman and Potter (2007) note that not all TOC groups fit specifically within 
the boundaries of the five structures, however the basic typologies provide a basis for 
understanding (Malkin, 2007). 
It is argued that the first three hierarchical structures are those closest to “traditional” notions 
of organised crime, whereas the final two structures are closest to organisations emerging in 
the current global climate. The latter two are described here in more detail. 
3.3 Core Group 
The core group is a structure that consists of several individuals who form a tight and 
structured group to conduct business, surrounded by a loose structure of associate members 
or networks who are used to carry out business depending on the core group’s intended 
criminal activities. Core groups generally limit their activities to one or only several ventures, 
acting in a more horizontal structure rather than hierarchical. The group exists solely for the 
profit motivation of individuals and shifts business activity to whichever venture generates 
the greatest profit. The core group is arguably one of the most readily emerging forms of 
organised crime structure and in some cases is the result of continued law enforcement 
pressure and as part of the groups adaptation to more sophisticated means (United Nations, 
2002, pp.39-41; Lyman & Potter, 2007, pp.13-14). 
3.4 Criminal Network 
The criminal network is the clearest example of the globalisation of TOC and illustrates the 
measures that individuals and groups have taken to avoid detection and interference by LEAs 
(Cressey, 1997; Malkin, 2007). Criminal networks are the loosely organised, highly 
adaptable, fluid networks of individuals that engage themselves in illicit activities with 
regularly shifting alliances (Cressey, 1997, p.3; Williams, 2001, p.70; United Nations, 2002, 
p.41; Lyman & Potter, 2007, p.14). The network’s shape, organisation and membership 
continually changes depending on the individuals, attributes and/or skills required.  
The lack of predefined identity and structure makes it difficult for LEAs to infiltrate or 
dismantle the network. Whilst key individuals may exist, their association is usually 
distanced. This ensures that even if LEAs successfully target and prosecute one individual the 
network will still remain connected and operational (United Nations, 2002, p.41-43; Lyman 
& Potter, 2007, pp.14-15). As noted by the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) in their 
Annual Organised Crime Report (2009, p.6), the organised crime groups that pose the most 
serious threat are those that are fluid and adaptable, and are resilient to interventions, 
rebuilding quickly after disruption. It is for these reasons that this form of criminal network is 
emerging as the new forefront of TOC structures (Lyman & Potter, 2007). 
3.5 Vulnerabilities of TOC 
It is noted that there is minimal research on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of TOC 
groups. Current research largely focuses less on the vulnerabilities of criminal enterprises and 
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more on the vulnerabilities of victims and subsequent propositions as how to reduce these 
vulnerabilities.  
However, by understanding the structure of criminal enterprises it is possible to identify a 
core vulnerability: communication (Malkin, 2007). Criminals require instantaneous 
communication that spans the globe amongst their networks of contacts, and as such the very 
sophistication and complexity that dictates their business activities also makes it highly 
susceptible to high quality intelligence attack. 
Grabosky and Smith (1998, p.188) argue that the use of telecommunications by criminals is 
categorised into four basic methods: coordinating and planning criminal activities;  
marketing and distribution of illicit services or products; sustaining the organisational 
structure; and obstruction of law enforcement investigations (Grabosky & Smith, 1998, 
p.188). Through the identification of these contact and communication points by LEAs, vital 
information can be acquired and subsequent intelligence developed to facilitate operational 
response strategies.  
While Grabosky and Smith (1998) note a variety of communication strategies used by 
criminal enterprises, since their research the use of technology has advanced significantly. 
Mobile phones and Short Message Service (SMS) text messages, electronic mail (email), 
message forums, instant chat services and Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephony 
services (Jackson et al., 2007) are now increasingly prevalent. Criminals have been found to 
programme mobile phones to send or receive from specific phone numbers and are known to 
exploit the easy availability and poor identity checks of mobile phone prepaid SIM 
(Subscriber Identity Module) cards along with access to cheap handsets. This allows them to 
reduce the risk of detection and interception and limits their links to other criminals ( Jackson 
et al., 2007; Waters, Ball & Dudgeon, 2008).  
The internet provides access to a growing multitude of free and temporary email accounts 
that require no identification and can transmit messages with relative anonymity (Waters, 
Ball & Dudgeon, 2008). The growing availability of encryption devices also allows criminals 
to either encode whole messages or messages within an attachment such as an image, 
document or link. (Bakier, 2007). Otherwise known as steganography, this technique is 
designed to ensure message content appears innocent if intercepted. Whilst “off the shelf” 
products are readily available for use by criminals they are also available to LEAs for 
decryption purposes (Jackson et al., 2007). To combat this, criminal enterprises—particularly 
those in Eastern Europe—have been known to develop their own software and methods 
(Abadinsky, 2009).  
Despite the available research, Malkin (2007, p.18) notes that there is a distinct lack of 
research examining the social structures of criminal enterprises and both verbal and 
non-verbal communication that occurs within criminal networks. Much of the existing 
research focuses solely on the flow or path of the communication, rather than the ‘how’ and 
‘what’ of the actual communication (Malkin, 2007, pp.18, 22). This highlights another gap 
surrounding the concepts of CIT and the ability to identify its effectiveness and most practical 
use. 
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3.6 Legal Responses within Australia 
Over the past decade Australia has introduced a variety of reforms to assist in the combat of 
transnational criminal activities occurring on and off shore (Hughes, 1999, p.10). Cornall 
(2005, p.62) and Irwin (2001, pp.5-6) identify that policy and operational responses are two 
key facets required to challenge this societal threat. Administrative arrangements have 
strengthened Australia’s fight through the expansion of agreed extradition treaties, mutual 
assistance agreements, Memorandums of Understanding with Asian neighbours and the 
establishment of international cooperation groups responsible for establishing laws, 
agreements and treaties (Cornall, 2005, p.62). Since the terror acts of September 11, 2001 on 
US soil, and the Bali Bombings of October 12, 2002, stringent legislation has been 
introduced to further the prevention of similar attacks within Australian borders. Legislative 
measures introduce definitions and offences for transnational criminal activities and further 
assist combating these crimes. This has included an expansion of powers such as the ability to 
seize and freeze assets identified as proceeds of criminal activities and an increase powers 
and responsibilities regarding investigation and arrest to law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies such as the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO). Australia has also promoted their involvement with the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development with attempts to ratify the Financial Action 
Task Force on Money Laundering’s 40 recommendations and nine special recommendations 
against money laundering and terrorism financing (Cahill & Marshall, 2004, pp. 52-66).  
Cornall (2005, p.62), Irwin (2001, p. 7), Wardlaw and Boughton (2006) and Chalk and 
Rosenau (2004, p. 38) all note that attempts to increase knowledge sharing through the 
interweaving of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, including the creation of the 
Australian Crime Commission, National Threat Assessment Centre and Transnational Crime 
Coordination Centre. The importance of including the private sector in intelligence sharing as 
a means of protecting crucial infrastructure as a major step in the right direction has also been 
recognised. 
In addition to policy responses, operational responses have been important in the fight against 
TOC. The extent of AFP’s international deployment and operations has enhanced intelligence 
gathering and diplomatic ties between nations, namely Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and 
those in the Pacific Islands. Glenn, Gordon and Florescu (2008) argue that whilst Australia 
has instigated significant changes to recognise the growth of TOC, where ‘transnational’ 
underscores organised crime, the need for a comprehensive, integrated global 
counter-strategy is required.  
Whilst crime groups are vulnerable to detection and disruption because of their 
communications, in addition to policy and operational responses, LEAs need a method and 
framework that allows them to combat these crimes efficiently and successfully. The next 
section examines the modern policing methodologies, their appropriateness in fighting TOC 
and their ability to effectively utilise technology that can exploit criminal communications. 
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4. Policing Methodologies 
4.1 Models of Policing 
In an ever changing world driven by a media-fuelled obsession of demanding best practice in 
crime reduction, policing methodologies have developed into their own research niche as 
attempts to develop a ‘perfect solution’ come and go. Ratcliffe (2008a; 2008b) and Weisburd 
and Eck (2004) contend that there are five primary models: traditional policing, 
community-orientated policing, problem-orientated policing, computer statistics and 
intelligence-led policing. Each model has its own differing concepts of strategic goals and 
possesses its own strengths and weaknesses.  
Weisburd and Eck (2004, p. 44) argue that the traditional model of policing can be seen as a 
“one size fits all” arsenal of reactive strategies to suppress crime regardless of the nature, 
level or other variations of crime within the jurisdiction. These strategies include rapid 
response to callouts, random community patrols, follow up investigations and occasional 
intensive enforcement and arrest policies (Weisburd & Eck, 2004, pp. 44-45). Eck and 
Rosenbaum (1994) and Conser et al. (2005, pp. 329-330) similarly argue that traditional 
policing has four primary functions: control crime, provide immediate response, arrest and 
serve justice, and provide ‘non-emergency’ services. As such the model relies solely on law 
enforcement powers to prevent crime (Conser et al., 2005; Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994). 
Subsequently, Goldstein (1987) and Ratcliffe (2008b, p. 271) both argue that the primary 
drawback with this methodology is that this “enforcing the law” attitude results in a distinct 
ineffectiveness in promoting long term crime control, arguably the result of being a reactive 
tactic rather than a proactive strategy (Goldstein, 1987; Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 271). It is 
important to note that arguments made against the traditional methodology contain a source 
of bias resulting from their primary objective to provide support for an alternate policing 
methodology. However, there is also a distinct lack of empirical evidence or explanation 
supporting the reasoning for successes of the traditional model.  
Community-orientated policing (COP) is grounded in the notion that through community 
interaction and support, crime and fear of crime can be controlled. Police act in a role as a 
facilitator within the community as they establish a balance between police duties and 
community responsibilities. Contact with the community in a means of establishing why 
crime is occurring rather than a simple response to calls for service is promoted as a 
fundamental purpose of COP (Goldstein 1987).  However, in their own review of COP 
research, Adams, Rohe and Arcury (2002), and Eck and Rosenbaum (1994) argue that there 
is a clear lack of clarity as to what exactly passes as community policing and that the benefits 
and impact COP has on crime have been mixed during research evaluation. The disagreement 
as to what actually constitutes and defines community policing thus makes evaluation 
difficult, but adoption and proclaimed use by an LEA easy (Ratcliffe, 2008b, p. 70).  
Problem-orientated policing (POP) is an approach that involves examining and analysing 
clustered incidents to determine an underlying cause of crime and implement strategies 
specifically to address the problem. POP focuses on the use of new preventative responses 
that engage the wider community when their contribution can potentially help to reduce the 
International Journal of Social Science Research 
ISSN 2327-5510 
2014, Vol. 2, No. 1 
http://ijssr.macrothink.org 8 
problem (Goldstein, 1990; Centre for Problem Oriented Policing, 2009). This approach is 
similar to situational crime prevention strategies (Goldstein in Scott, 2000, p.5) however, 
rather than being a specific policy as in the case of situational crime strategies, POP guides 
the LEA’s whole doctrine in crime prevention. John and Maguire (2003), and Braga and 
Weisburd (2006) note there is a clear structural difficulty in implementing POP in practice, 
with an evaluation of numerous studies indicating a disconnect from POP’s articulated aims 
and the realistic practices of LEAs. 
Computer Statistics (COMPSTAT) is a management philosophy that utilises geographical 
information systems for crime mapping to identify problems and approach crime reduction 
and resource management in line with relevant problem areas. Due to the primary focus on 
statistics, critics such as Weisburd et al. (2003) and Manning (2005) claim that 
COMPSTAT’s effectiveness is minimal due to the ability to misconstrue data and the 
subsequent ability to greatly under-represent crime. Criticism further extends with Manning 
(2005) claiming that COMPSTAT goes so far as to regenerate and reinforce the hierarchical 
and methodological guides of traditional policing, a structure that COMPSTAT along with 
COP and POP were designed to eradicate. 
A common factor, and subsequently a negative consequence, presented in these four 
methodologies, is their specific focus on addressing localised and ‘minor’ crime. As such 
they fail to possess the qualities required to address the more serious threat of TOC.  
Whilst over the past two decades there has been a noticeable shift in the culture and strategies 
within most, if not all, Australian LEAs towards using a more proactive policing approach for 
tackling all forms of criminal activity, the traditional reactive model of policing still exists as 
the primary methodology (Chan, 1997; Ratcliffe, 2008a). This has been precipitated by the 
increasing sophistication of criminal enterprises, which has made it imperative to work 
towards the disruption and demolition of the network structures instead of merely arresting 
individual criminals within organised groups (Robertson, 1997; Wardlaw & Boughton, 
2006). The attempts to break up criminal networks will fail until all available information is 
developed, analysed and transformed into an intelligence product suitable for use by law 
enforcement personnel. As such there needs to be a shift within the law enforcement 
environment that views intelligence as a precondition to effective policing, rather than as a 
supplement. To encourage this change there is a need to break down intelligence ‘obstacles’ 
as LEAs enter the new era of the ILP methodology (Wardlaw & Boughton, 2006, p. 135).  
4.2 ILP Methodology 
Whilst the use of intelligence has been common practice within the military arena for 
centuries, its application as a proactive rather than a reactive strategy within Australian LEAs 
is still a relatively new concept. ILP has no universally accepted definition, however it is 
identified by the core idea that policing, from tactical to strategic levels and beyond to 
government policy, should be informed by relevant and actionable intelligence analysis. It is 
developed as a model that uses intelligence to guide and shape policy, strategy and 
operations, rather than simply solving or supporting singular investigations (Wardlaw & 
Boughton, 2006, p.135).  
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A central precept of the ILP methodology is to focus on the prolific and persistent offenders 
who commit a majority of the crime with the requirement to “tackle and incapacitate” the 
primary offenders of serious crime (Flood, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008b, p.167; Flood & Gasper, 
2009, p. 51). Through the development of an ILP grounded system, the ability to manage this 
criminality can be identified.  
As Flood and Gasper (2009, p. 57) note, the primary difficulty that LEAs face is simply 
trying to visualise and understand the criminal environment. They argue that whilst on the 
surface it is initially confusing, chaotic, complex and ever changing in both its impact and 
character, there always remains an area that is stable and enduring (Flood & Gasper, 2009, p. 
57). It is the identification of this area by the collection, collation and analysis of data and 
subsequent development of intelligence that reveals a systematic and comprehensible 
environment. This understanding enables the basis for a “highly impactive strategy” that can 
at the very least, provide a starting point for dealing with the bigger picture. Meeting this 
requirement, ILP is the most suitable methodology for combating TOC (Flood & Gasper, 
2009, p. 57).  
The current lack of evaluation of ILP, along with a requirement for additional research and 
development of a model of best practice for implementation of ILP into new jurisdictions is 
clearly acknowledged within the literature (Ratcliffe, 2002; 2008a). This is in part due to the 
difficulty to effectively evaluate business models. Within Australia, the use and slow 
integration of ILP has been used with limited, and in some cases, flawed evaluation of its 
effectiveness. Heldon (2009) and Ratcliffe (2008b) discuss the effectiveness and limitations 
of Operation Anchorage, a short term ILP operation carried out by the AFP in response to a 
spike in property crime in the Australian Capital Territory in 2001. Whilst the operation was 
deemed effective following its closure and resulted in a 21 per cent decrease in burglaries 
combined with a residual effect lasting 45 weeks, its unsustainability resulted from limited 
resources and high costs. Heldon (2009, pp. 128-129), argues that the operation was flawed in 
its use of the ILP methodology—whilst offender targeting was present, it failed to address the 
underlying causal factors a primary focus on tactical intelligence meant that the strategic and 
long-term ideals were forgotten. As such Heldon (2009, pp. 130) theorised that had the AFP 
embraced ILP as a whole and addressed these issues, it is likely a more robust result could 
have been achieved.  
There is also an apparent gap in literature regarding the specific discussion of intelligence 
collection. Whilst Ratcliffe (2008a; 2008b) frequently encourages the use of covert means of 
intelligence collection and briefly discusses the use of informants, he, along with a multitude 
of existing literature, fails to examine the covert means in depth. In addition, there is an 
obvious disconnect in the literature between the use of CIT and ILP as a whole.  
Of all the policing methodologies ILP is uniquely positioned to effectively combat TOC. For 
example: the United Kingdom’s (UK) Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) (SOCA, 
2010) argues that the majority of current LEAs are structured for bureaucratic efficiency. The 
operational focus is on individual crime types to satisfy the priorities and objectives of a 
government led by the media advancing community concern. Conversely, criminal 
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enterprises rarely think or deal in terms of isolated and singular crime areas. Instead, they 
simply see the opportunities available to them for making money if they possess the relevant 
criminal capability, and frequently amalgamate crime types into their enterprise as a means of 
maximizing profits whilst ideally minimizing detection (Serious Organised Crime Agency, 
2006, p. 15; Flood and Gasper, 2009, p. 57). 
The UK’s Audit Commission (1993) noted that the targeting of known and recidivist 
offenders, criminal leaders and criminal innovators is the cornerstone of any proactive 
policing model. A central precept of the ILP methodology is to focus on the prolific and 
persistent offenders who commit a majority of the crime with the requirement to ‘tackle and 
incapacitate’ the primary offenders of serious crime (Flood, 2004; Flood and Gasper, 2009, p. 
51; Ratcliffe, 2008b, p. 167). Through the development of an ILP grounded system the ability 
to manage this criminality can be identified. As Flood and Gasper (2009) note, the primary 
difficulty that LEAs face is simply trying to visualize and understand the criminal 
environment. They argue that whilst on the surface it is initially confusing, chaotic, complex 
and ever changing in both its impact and character, there always remains an area that is stable 
and enduring (Flood and Gasper, 2009). It is the identification of this area by the collection, 
collation and analysis of data, and subsequent development of intelligence, that allows the 
development of a clearer understanding of what once appeared complex and haphazard, and 
reveals a systematic and comprehensible environment. This understanding enables the basis 
for a ‘highly impactive strategy’ that can, at the very least, provide a beneficial starting point 
for dealing with the bigger picture. These requirements are answered by the ILP philosophy, 
characterizing it as the most suitable methodology for combating TOC (Flood and Gasper, 
2009).  
It has well been documented that the key resolve to TOC is a comprehensive, integrated 
global counter-strategy that involves the continual cooperation, support and knowledge 
sharing of law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide (Glenn, Gordon, & Florescu, 
2008). A point that then resonates is that without intelligence, the required case for 
cooperation among countries and agencies cannot be made in the first place, the priorities of 
the LEA cannot be identified and the threats posed cannot be tackled. 
The literature illustrates that the proactive nature of ILP is the most beneficial framework that 
can fight criminal enterprises and support CIT appropriately, as will be discussed in the 
following section. 
Communication Interception Technology (CIT) 
In line with the development and growth of communication technology, there has been an 
increasing requirement for the use of interception technologies. This ‘popularity’ has resulted 
in frequent debate regarding the most appropriate definition (Branch, 2003; Starey, 2005; 
Electronic Frontier Australia, 2006). The term ‘communication interception technology’ 
(CIT) resulted from the preconceived notions attached to the definition of 
‘telecommunications’—largely associated with solely traditional telecommunication 
methods, such as telephone calls. Conversely, CIT implies a broader scope for all forms and 
methods of communication and is subsequently used to reference the interception methods 
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and related technology. It is important to note that concerning CIT, under both the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (TIA Act) and 
Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), communications are divided 
into two distinct categories: live communications and stored communications.  
‘Live communications’ addresses the category of communication that passes over a 
telecommunication system, such as voice telephony.  The ‘live’ aspect concerns the fact that 
during a telephone call, the recipient instantly receives the message being communicated in 
‘real time’ (Starey, 2005; Ahmed, 2007). Starey (2005) argues the key aspect personifying 
live communication is that without interception (listening or recording) there is no record of 
the conversation once communication ceases.  
Conversely, stored communication or communication stored in transit covers communication 
that during the course of its transmission is stored on one or more pieces of equipment of a 
carrier or service provider before being retrieved and accessed by the recipient. Starey (2005) 
and Ahmed (2007) both state that the concept of stored communication applies to most forms 
of electronic communication. During the transmission of electronic communication—such as 
email, SMS text messaging, voice mail, internet chat or instant messaging software and VoIP 
telephony—the data packets transmitting this information are stored, at least momentarily, on 
various service provider servers and computer equipment. This information can therefore be 
intercepted prior to the intended recipient actually receiving the message (Starey, 2005; 
Ahmed, 2007). It is argued that this breakdown is especially important with regards to 
legislative definitions and subsequent abilities to intercept communications, where 
interception is the act of listening to, recording or reading through any means a 
communication without the knowledge of the person making the communication (Starey, 
2005; Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act Cth, 2006; Ahmed, 2007). 
Signals Intelligence  
Signals intelligence (SIGINT), has had a long history of use by military forces around the 
world ever since the tactical use of both wired and wireless communication technologies. 
Richelson (1999, p. 167) claims that traditionally, signals intelligence is considered one of the 
most important and sensitive forms of intelligence able to provide a vast amount of 
information. Whilst traditionally utilised by foreign governments or groups, the expansion 
into criminal groups has slowly developed over the years. Communication Intelligence 
(COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) form the majority of CIT relevant to law 
enforcement and can be used in conjunction with open source intelligence (OSINT). 
COMINT, the interception of signals between people, broadly corresponds to live 
communications such as telephone calls, while ELINT, the interception of signals between 
machines, corresponds to stored communication mediums such as email or SMS.  
Whilst the DSD plays a pivotal role in intelligence collection and analysis within the 
Australian Intelligence Community (AIC), its membership and subsequent framework with 
the AIC limits its functions to a national security oriented position. Section 4 of the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) outlines security as including 
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espionage, sabotage, politically motivated violence, the promotions of communal violence, 
foreign interference, attacks on Australia critical infrastructure and defence systems and also 
includes carrying out of Australia's responsibilities to any other foreign country in relation to 
threats to security with a particular focus on politically motivated violence. This is further 
exemplified restrictions imposed under the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth). Section 11 
of the Act in particular, explicitly details that “the agencies’ functions do not include: (a) the 
carrying out of police functions; or (b) any other responsibility for the enforcement of the 
law.” 
This effectively prohibits DSD from intercepting signals originating from within Australia 
and requires a “double up” of resources as Australian LEAs must purchase, maintain, operate 
and analyse their own interception technology. This is coupled with the need to go through 
the rigorous process of requesting appropriate intercept warrants and attempting to maintain a 
quality level of information sharing between multiple agencies. This separation of 
intelligence, law enforcement and also foreign and domestic intelligence is a significant 
obstacle to the overall success of effective transnational crime fighting (Chalk & Rosenau, 
2004; Bhaskar & Zhang, 2007; Brady, 2008; Ratcliffe, 2008b; Chalk et al., 2009).  
Recent developments in the United States regarding the interception of private 
communications by the National Security Agency (NSA) in support of the war on terror, has 
practitioners and academics engaged in a comprehensive debate surrounding Fourth 
Amendment rights to privacy, under the US Constitution. 
Under US law, intelligence agencies are not required to obtain a warrant in order to collect 
information on foreign adversaries and terrorists with communications that occur outside the 
US. When electronic communications either transit or occur within the US, however, 
intelligence officials must use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). To use 
FISA, the government must show probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a 
foreign power or agent of a foreign power (Bazan, 2009). Following the events of 911 
President Bush enacted Executive Powers enabling the NSA to intercept communications 
domestically in response to an ongoing terrorist threat. Supported by Congress in this 
instance, there was agreement that greater flexibility with regard to the interception of 
communications was needed. Congress also passed amendments to the FISA legislation in 
the USA-Patriot Act in 2001. This Act significantly reduced the standard required of a federal 
officer to apply for intelligence collection under the FISA framework. In addition to this 
Congress also amended FISA in the Protect America Act of 2007 and the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008 (Bazan, 2009). 
The ability to operate a warrantless surveillance program (of communications) was initiated 
by President Bush in 2005, and became known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) 
or “warrantless wiretapping” (Risen & Lichtblau, 2005). With reports of the surveillance 
program slowly finding their way to the public domain, some argued that the program was 
necessary to intercept al-Qaeda – related communications more quickly than the FISA 
process allowed. Further to this, supporters of the program claimed that the FISA process did 
not allow them to gain valuable intelligence on the terrorist group in a timely manner (Liptak, 
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2007). While others argued that the President has overstepped the bounds of his authority by 
spying on Americans and that the President could not completely bypass the FISA process 
because Congress explicitly intended FISA to be the exclusive means for authorising this 
type of surveillance. Furthermore, some argued that the program failed to offer sufficient 
protections to prevent the government from monitoring communications of innocent 
Americans and that the program lacked sufficient oversight (Risen & Lichtblau, 2005). 
In 2007, the US Attorney General informed Congress that the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) had issued orders authorising the collection of international 
communications into and out of the United States when the government had probable cause 
to believe that the communications belonged to a terrorist organisation. As a result of the 
FISC order the President would discontinue his authorisation of TSP and conduct all 
electronic surveillance under FISA. Some saw the updating of FISA in 2007/08 as a way to 
facilitate additional backdoor intelligence gathering practices, such as large-scale data mining 
and represented a weakening of civil liberties in the United States (Lowenthal, 2009). 
As with many democracies, the challenge surrounding the interception of communications 
will remain balancing the rights of the individuals and the needs of the public interest. 
Open Source Intelligence 
Another form of intelligence gathering used in the fight against transnational crime is open 
source intelligence (OSINT). Although having been in existence for as long as SIGINT, it has 
been increasingly relied upon since the explosion of the internet and the increasing 
availability of information in subsequent years.  
OSINT is defined in a similar fashion throughout the literature, with Gibson (2004, p. 17) 
defining it as “...the analytical exploitation of information that is legally available and in the 
public domain”. OSNIT can be obtained from various sources including traditional media 
broadcast, commercial ‘on-line’ premium, specialist technical/tactical, ‘grey literature’, overt 
human observers, commercial imagery and  mapping specialists.  Specific examples 
include the use of newspapers, the Internet, phone books, scientific journals, textbooks, 
periodicals, books, pamphlets, and radio and television broadcasts (Umphress, 2005, p. 84; 
Best, 2006, p. 5). 
In terms of the practical application of OSINT in the public sector, it has great potential in the 
areas of defence and security, which are becoming increasingly complex as new 
communication technologies aid in the emergence of transnational criminal networks 
(Gibson, 2004, p. 20).  As Shelley (2002, p. 4) maintains, terrorist and transnational criminal 
groups use “cellular and satellite phones, the Internet, email and chat rooms” to 
communicate.  “They code their messages through encryption and steganography (hiding 
messages within other messages)” (Shelley, 2002, p. 4).  Moreover, Stohl (2006, p. 231) 
acknowledges the use of the Internet by transnational crime groups in order to spread 
propaganda and/or to recruit members.  Since these public forms of communication are 
being exploited by criminal networks, OSINT is indispensable in the fight against 
transnational crime.  As Gibson (2004, p. 19) stated, OSINT has emerged as a result of 
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“…changing aspects of contemporary society as both a product of it and a tool to deal with 
it”. 
The use of OSINT in a law enforcement context is not without its problems, particularly in 
relation information overload, quality control, misinformation and/or legal issues. However, 
the utility of the Internet in creating OSINT cannot be ignored.  In this respect, some authors 
call for greater public funding and focus upon OSINT protocols, especially within the public 
sector, in order to combat global issues such as transnational crime.  As Gibson (2004, p. 
19) recognized, OSINT is both a product of the ‘changing aspects of contemporary society’ 
as well as a tool to deal with it.  However, more focused efforts at integrating OSINT into 
the broader Intelligence Community are required, especially at a public sector level.  Indeed, 
“…in an age characterised by instantaneous, distributed, publicly available, open source 
information, uninformed decision-making arising from an inability to understand, harness and 
exploit the potential of this new breed of information becomes a significant security 
weakness (Gibson, 2004, p. 20).  Not only is it a security weakness, but it is an unforgivable 
security threat.  As Hulnick (cited in Mercado, 2004) stated, “Neither glamorous nor 
adventurous, open sources are nonetheless the basic building block for secret intelligence”.  
In this regard, OSINT is merely one form of intelligence and is intended as one thread in a 
complex web of intelligence sources that can be used be LEAs in areas such as the fight 
against TOC. 
Issues Surrounding CIT 
Whilst SIGINT has been used extensively and effectively in military environments for over a 
century, it is difficult to comprehend why CIT continues to remain so severely limited in its 
use. In much of the literature, there are two primary issues surrounding the use of 
CIT—legislation (governing usage) and privacy. These issues directly correlate with 
concerns regarding the infringement of privacy rights influencing the controls and limitations 
placed on the use of CIT within the legislation. Despite this, there is a distinct lack of 
research examining these issues in context of the practice application of CIT. 
Starey (2005) analyses the Australian legal framework governing CIT comparing it with the 
United States’ (US) framework. It is argued that whilst Australia cannot directly adopt the 
same legislation applied in the US, we can learn from their errors and debates to improve our 
own laws and increase their clarity (Starey, 2005, p. 55). A common feature evident in both 
countries is the narrow restrictions on, and subsequent difficulty in, being issued a warrant for 
lawful interception under the TIA Act. Starey (2005) demonstrates that the current legislation 
caters for CIT only as a last resort and serves a primary purpose as an evidence gathering 
tool, rather than a forefront intelligence collection method. In contrast, stored 
communications are significantly easier to access under the Amendment Act. 
As argued by privacy advocate Electronic Frontier Australia (EFA) (2006), these responses 
seemingly position stored communications as a “less important” communicative method, 
despite the increasing adoption and preference of these methods over live communication by 
individuals and business. Their position however is degraded due to their failure to recognise 
the advantages attached to CIT in law enforcement and sole focus on rights to privacy. Whilst 
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it is undeniable that privacy is an important aspect of life, it also provides additional 
protection to criminals and criminal enterprises. Grabosky and Smith (1998, p. 29) argue that 
the respect for an individual’s privacy is not an absolute interest and is conversely subject to 
other competing interests of importance within society. The use of interception technology is 
justified when the social benefits of its use outweighs the cost of individual privacy. It is here 
that EFA (2006) lacks the ability to recognise the careful balance between privacy and 
enforcement—as power shifts in favour of increased privacy it greatly limits vital 
enforcement technique and technology.  
The sentiments of Electronic Frontier Australia (2006) are also shared by Bronitt and Stellios 
(2005, p. 887), whose evaluation of the regulatory framework for CIT in Australia results in 
the rejection of the ‘balancing’ model and proposes the development of a regulatory model 
advocating human rights and due process as a “paramount consideration”. Despite these 
claims however, they fail to detail the proposed model. Bronitt and Stellios (2005; 2006) also 
consistently raise concerns regarding the increasing use of interception technology by states 
and territories, rather than sole use by Federal agencies. What Bronitt and Stellios (2005; 
2006) fail to acknowledge is that the growth of TOC is not limited to breaching only federal 
or state laws, indeed they are well known to exploit proposed restrictions (Irwin 2001). 
Providing all agencies with access to these methods is an integral part of the unification of 
Australian LEAs, a factor which is stressed as an essential requirement throughout the 
literature (Irwin, 2001; Glenn, Gordon & Florescu, 2008; Flood & Ratcliffe, 2008b; Gasper, 
2009). 
The primary debate surrounding the use of CIT is the individual’s right to privacy and the 
public interest will continue for decades. What is apparent is the need for ongoing attention 
being applied to the laws (and oversight authorities) governing the use of CIT in the targeting 
of TOC.  
Implications for further research 
This paper highlights significant gaps in CIT, TOC and ILP literature, and in doing so 
provides the basis for future research in two key areas: the effectiveness and deployment of 
CIT by interviewing law enforcement investigators and analysts and closely examining 
national and international case studies; and the communicative methods, strategies and 
structures of TOC groups—in particular the ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘how’ and to a limited 
extent, ‘why’, of criminal communication.  
Whilst the use of CIT is seemingly essential in the fight against TOC, without a strong 
foundational knowledge of how it’s targeted and deployed, there will continue to be limits on 
the production of high quality intelligence. This second research need is noted also by Malkin 
(2007) and Grabosky and Smith (1998; 1999).  
Conclusion 
The globalization and growth of transnational organized crime (TOC) is a cause for great 
concern amongst society. While advancements in communication technologies have changed 
the communication landscape, they have also created opportunities for organized criminals to 
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use the available technology for their own illegal gains. Organized crime can no longer be 
considered in relation to strict geographic boundaries – it now extends globally across a 
spectrum of activities including money laundering, drug trafficking, sex/human trafficking, 
people smuggling, arms trafficking, endangered species trafficking, cybercrime and, most 
notably over the last decade, terrorism (Abadinsky, 2009; Davies, 2007; Lyman and Potter, 
2007; Australian Crime Commission, 2009; Borger, 2007; Grennan and Britz, 2006).  
However, while the increased availability of communication technologies and their usage 
presents opportunities for criminals and corrupt networks, it also presents opportunities for 
the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) tasked with fighting such crime and corruption. The 
need for two or more criminal or corrupt entities to exchange information regarding their 
planned activities is a critical point at which LEAs can disrupt those activities. As such, 
communication interception technology (CIT) presents itself as a crucial weapon to be 
harnessed by LEAs. However, despite its possibilities CIT remains drastically underutilized 
as an investigative tool and, while literature exists on TOC and CIT, very few if any studies 
intersect to examine the theoretical or practical use of CIT as a tool to fight crime. 
Recognising the need to better understand how CIT is currently used, and could be used, to 
fight organized crime, this research builds on existing literature on organized crime and CIT, 
drawing them together to provide a clearer overview of CIT’s use in an enforcement and 
intelligence capacity. This was achieved by asking the following questions:  
1) How effective is CIT in the fight against TOC? and;  
2) How should the issues surrounding CIT be best managed within a practical law 
enforcement framework by English-speaking Commonwealth countries such as 
Australia that share comparable legislative platforms?  
In addition to addressing several gaps in the current literature the research identifies the most 
appropriate policing methodology – intelligence-led policing (ILP) – to underpin the use of 
CIT and how it can be, or is currently being, restricted by the policing culture and privacy 
concerns present in various English-speaking Commonwealth countries such as Australia.  
In doing so this research makes a valid contribution to the body knowledge in developing  
greater efficacy for law enforcement strategies and the disruption of the serious threat posed 
by TOC to society.  
TOC is a diverse and complex area costing global society in excesses of US$3 trillion 
annually – a figure which is set to grow (Borger, 2007).  This paper has highlighted that 
while new communication technologies provide new opportunities for criminal and corrupt 
networks to expand their operations they also provide a unique opportunity for LEAs and 
corruption investigators to disrupt these activities. By using CIT, investigators can garner 
timely and valuable information, better understand the structure and nature of the criminal 
entities they are targeting and uncover larger networks of criminal or corrupt operations. 
While the effectiveness of CIT is still difficult to determine based on current literature, what 
is apparent is that it presents as a powerful tool to combat the new and evolving criminal 
structures of today’s global environment. Its limited use in an investigative capacity is largely 
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due to the legal complexities and privacy concerns surrounding its use, as well as the cultural 
issues which mean that intelligence often fails to truly take centre stage in an investigation.  
However, there is a way forward. While there are barriers to the effective use of CIT in 
investigations this paper identifies how CIT can be embedded in an ILP framework while still 
supporting the underlying philosophy of the right to privacy and its balance with the public 
interest. Taking a common sense approach the paper seeks to balance the privacy rights of 
individuals – by ensuring legal thresholds are met – with the public interest, enabling 
investigators to access the necessary powers to utilize CIT in the effective investigation of 
TOC. 
As stated by Williams (1980, p. 35), ‘Intelligence is the most important single weapon in the 
armoury of law enforcement generally …’; as this paper attests, if embedded in a proactive 
ILP framework, CIT has the power to secure that intelligence, presenting as a powerful 
weapon in the fight against TOC and official corruption. 
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